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IN THE SUPREME O'.>URT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LAYNE R • :V!EACHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

GREAT BASIN YOUTH SERVICES,

Case No.

l 9 l 37

Defcndant-RC'spondcnt.

NATURE OF CASE

This is a claim and counterclaim regarding a termination of a written contract for
professional services (a copy of the contract is attached hereto as Appendix "A").
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT

After a bench trial on the merits, the lower Court granted Defendant-Respondent's
counterclaim for declaratory judgment by finding that the subject contract was properly
terminated for cause as per the terms of the contract, that there was not any breach of
the subject contract by Defendant-Respondent, and denied both specific performance or
damages to Plaintiff-Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Court uphold and affirm the lower Court's
decision in granting declaratory judgmE'nt by finding that the contract was terminated
for causC' and to deny Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal to reverse the lower Court's decision
and entC'r a judgment for damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant-Respondent adopts the statement of fflcts set forth in PlaintiffAppellant's brief except as follows:
(l)

Difficulties did not insue as a result of Defendant-Respondent's not having

requested any services of Plaintiff-Appellant prior to the termination of the contract as
stated in Plaintiff-Appellant's statement of facts (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 2). The
difficulties insued as a rcsull of Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to complete the two
assignments given him (trial transcript, p. 121, Findings of Fact No. 2); the unauthorized
exchange with a state official in the Department of Social Services in direct violation of
one of the provisions of the contract (Findings of Fact No. 3); the submission of 57 pages
of photocopied materials from a U.S. Justice Department publication as a Home Parent/
Foster Parent Manual compiled by Plaintiff-Appellant (Findings of Fact No. 5); the visit
with the youth Steve Trotter, a juvenile for which Defondant-Respondent had supervisory
responsibility, without contacting the home parent or the social worker assigned to the
youth (Findings of Fact No. 6); and, Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to move into one of
Defendant-Respondent's interior offices at 9136 South State Street from an office on the
same floor for which Defendant-Respondent also paid the rent.
(2)

Plaintiff-Appellant's brief states that the Court did not make any express

conclusion of law that the acts of the Plaintiff-Appellant "breached the contract in
question or that the breaches were material."

(Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 2).

Plaintiff-Appellant misconstrues the law and is attempting to argue it in the "statement
of facts." Such an express finding is not necessary and even if it wer€', ther€' is ample
evidence demonstrating a material breach by Plaintiff-Appellant.
infra.)
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(Sec Points 2 and 3

ARGUMENT
POINT l
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT HA VE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR
ITS CONCLUSIONS

On appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant's sole argument for reversal of the lower Court's
decision is that the lower Court misconstrued the evidence in finding that the DefcndantRcspondent properly terminated the contract "for cause" because of the PlaintiffAppellant's conduct. The Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to reconstruct the evidence in a
light most favorable to him.

The standard of review of lower Court decisions is well

established and uncontroverted.
This Court stated in Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980)
that:
The findings and conclusions of the District Court must be
affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to
support them (footnote omitted). Further, the evidence and all
inferences that fairly and reasonably might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment
entered (footnote omitted).
Again in 1981, this Court reiterated the presumption in favor of a lower Court's
decision. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah 1981).
On appeal, this Court must consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact. Those
findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and may
not be overturned so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. (Citations omitted)
Both of these standards were most recently reaffirmed by this Court in Hal Taylor
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff-Appellant citC's each of the findings of fact and attempts to either
construe' the evidence such that thC' finding is incorrect or fault the lower Court for not
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expressly stating that each finding of fact was

ii

breach by the Pl11intiff-Appcllant of the

contract.
ThC' issues and evidence' were fully prl'sl'ntcd and argued 11t trial. At thl' clos(' of
trial, the Court stated that "I have rl'vicwl'd thl' exhibits that werl' rl'ccivl'd by the
Court.

I have reviewed your trial Memorandum, Mr. Hansen. I have reviewed the file

before trial this morning, and now having heard the evidence . . . The court is constrained to find that on the basis of evidence that taken together, the actions or
inactions of the Plaintiff, if you will, constitute a course of conduct contrary to the
fostering of the type of relations required under the contract of December 23, 1982 to
mutually benefit both parties." (Trial transcript, p. 120).
The lower Court further concluded that the findings of fact were the basis for the
proper termination by stating in the conclusions of law that, "Based upon the foregoing
Findings of Fact . . . (I) the totality of the facts convince the Court by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant justifiably terminated 'for cause' the December 23, 1982
contract with Plaintiff." (Conclusion of Law no. l ).
The trial Court clearly took into account all of the evidence in rendering its
decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant should not be allowed to rehash the evidence on appeal.

The Plaintiff-Appellant has presented nothing which would lead this Court to find "no
reasonable basis in the evidence to support" the lower Court's conclusions.
POINT 2
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MISCONSTRUES THE EVIDENCE IN
ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT THE ACI'S OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT WERE MINOR IN NATURE AND NOT INVOLVING THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT

Plaintiff-Appellant cites four (4) of the situations as found in the findings of fact:
(I)

Phone call of January 1 O, 1983 to Russ Van Yleet (Findings of Fact No. 3).

Plaintiff-Appellant notes that the finding of fact citC's the provision of thl' contract
-4-

prohibiting contact by Plaintiff-Appellant with the State Department of Social Services
but th('n arguC's that thC' finding of fact did not make any express finding that the call
violatC'd th(' provision.

Howcv('r, it is beyond argument that the citing of the provision

right after stating that Plaintiff-Appellant made the call clearly indicates that the lower
Court held that it was a violation of the provision. Plaintiff-Appellant admits that it is
implied (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5). As stated above, the rule of review is that all
infer('nces must be viewed "in a light most favorable to the judgment entered."
Plaintiff-Appellant also argues that the testimony of Defendant-Respondent's
director, Kent Burke, is that it did not violate the contract provision. This allegation is
difficult to comprehend since Plaintiff-Appellant quotes Mr. Burke correctly (PlaintiffAppellant's brief, p. 5) in responding in the affirmative to the question, "Did Mr. Van
Vleet say anything to you that would indicate that that was creating an adversary
relationship between you and the State of Utah?" Mr. Burke's response was, "He thought
it was very strange that Layne would be calling about that, m·" (Trial transcript, p. 64;
emphasis added).

In fact, in previous testimony, Mr. Burke made it very clear that he

felt the unauthorized telephone can by Plaintiff-Appellant had a negative effect. Mr.
Burke was asked, "After you were informed that Mr. Meacham had contacted the State
of Utah, did you have any concern or feeling about that?" His answer was, "Yes, I did."
He was then asked, "What was your concern•" He responded, "I felt like he ought not to
be doing that type of thing. We had asked him not to, and it put us in a bad light in the
sense that I felt like he was explaining at least to them that we didn't have the money to
pay him or we are not managing our company well enough to meet our bills."
Then, Plaintiff-Appellant's brief quotes Mr. Burke as admitting at trial that in his
deposition that, "I didn't remember the telephone call." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p.
5). This is inserted in an attempt to show that the telephone call by Plaintiff-Appellant
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to the statC' official was inconsC'qUC'ntial bC'causc :Vlr. Burke did not <:>v<:>n r<:>call it at his
deposition. This quote comp!C'tcly misconstruC's '.Vlr. BurkC''s tC'stimony and takC's it out of
context. In fact, the telcphonC' call Mr. BurkC' is referring to is not Plaintiff-Appellant";
call to the state but its his own phone call to Mr. Van VleC't regarding PlaintiffAppellant's previous unauthorized call.
By Mr. HansC'n:
Q
Mr. Burke, how long was it after the time that
you learned or Mr.
phone call to
Russell Van
Vleet that vou contacted Mr. Van Vleet?

A.
I believe it was probably a couple of days before I
called him and asked him about it, and then I talked with him
again about two or three weeks later at a youth corrections
meeting.

Q
In your deposition, didn't you testify that it could
have been three weeks or so?
A
Yes.
telephone call.

At

the

time, I

didn't

remember

the

Q
So you are saying bet ween the time of your
deposition that was taken on March 8th and the present time,
you now recall a phone call within two days of that that you
hadn't -

A

I believe it was two or three days after that.

(Trial transcript, p. 67; emphasis added).
(2)

Request of January 31, 1983 to Move Offices (Findings of Fact No. 4).

Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the request to move offices was not part of the contract
and that the lower "Court did not find that it did" (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5).
Plaintiff-Appellant again attempts to reargue the evidence and the findings of fact. The
Finding of Fact No. 4 was clearly a part of the basis for the lower Court's decision as all
of the findings of fact were as found in Conclusion of Law No. l quotC'd above.
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Th('r(' is substantial cvidenc(' to support the conclusion that Plaintiff-Appellant's
unwillingness to move from an office paid for by Defendant-Respondent to another closer
offie(' also paid for by Defendant-Respondent so that he could interact better and
develop a better working relationship with Defendant-Respondent's staff was one of the
actions or inactions of Plaintiff-Appellant which gave rise to the proper termination of
the contract. (Trial transcript, pp. 49-53).
(3)

Home Parent/Foster Parent Manual Submitted January 22, 1983 (Findings of

Fact No. 5). Again Plaintiff-Appellant argues that there is no finding that the "manual
failed to meet contract specifications."

(Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5).

However,

Plaintiff-Appellant then goes on to admit that while the manual was not an express
provision of the contract, the assignment to do the manual "was a proper one and within
the general scope of the work required by the contract." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p.
5). The Trial Court did find that the manual did not meet the parameters of the assignment. As quoted above, the Court based it's conclusion of law on the findings of fact.
Furthermore, the Court at the conclusion of trial expressly stated that the manual
episode in and of itself might have been sufficient to justify the termination (trial
transcript, p.

120).

This conclusion is clearly supported by the evidence, when

interpreted in a light most favorable to support the judgment. It shows that PlaintiffAppe\lant only did one hour of work on the manual for which he was prepaid $1,500 (trial
transcript, p. 86); he did no more than photocopy 57 pages of someone else's work and
type a cover page (trial transcript, pp. 34-36, 55, 79, 86; Exhibits D-29 and D-30); the
Defendant-Respondent already had a copy of the entire book from which PlaintiffAppellant copied (trial transcript, p. 35); Plaintiff-Respondent initially attempted to take
credit for the work and act as if he had spent several hours on it (trial transcript, pp. 36,
37); and it did not contain the information required by the assignment (trial transcript,
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pp. 13-14, 31, 57; Exhibit D-28).
(4)

Plaintiff-Appellant's VIC'ding with StC've TrottC'r (Findings of Fact No. 6).

Plaintiff-Appellant docs not allege that Plaintiff-AppC'llant actually contacted the
youth's homC' parC'nt or social worker prior to making contact with the boy nor that he
was not aware of the Defendant-Respondent's basic rule that he should makC' contact
with them prior to seeing any of the youth. (LNter to Plaintiff-Appellant explaining rule
prior to his seeing Steve Trotter, Exhibit P-5).
uncontradicted

that

Defendant-Respondent's

Plaintiff-Appellant to see Steve Trotter.
this.

He alleges that the evidence was

director

orally

gave

permission

for

There is evidence that clearly contradicts

'V!r. Burke, Defendant-Respondent's director, was asked "Did you even tell him

[Plaintiff-Appellant] in that meeting that he did not have to first talk with the home
parent before he went out and met with the youth?" His answer was, "No. I would never
say that." He was then asked, "Did you ever tell him that before he talked, that he did
not have to talk with the social worker, Roy Hussey or Matt Calpooa before he went out
and talked with Steve Trotter or any youth." He responded, "No. It's standard procedure
to contact these people and to go through them and provide them any kind of interaction
with the youth." (Trial transcript, pp. 48, 49.)
Next Plaintiff-Appellant states that "no claim is made that this contact with this
boy had any actual or even potentially detrimental consequence." However, Mr. Burke
testified that he discovered that Plaintiff-Appellant had not followed proper procedure
when he found out that the social worker "was upset and the home parent was wondering
what was going on." (Trial transcript, p. 47). Furthermore, when Mr. Burke was asked by
Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel if Steve Trotter had made any negative comment about the
contact, he responded, "Only in the sense that he was unsure of who Layne [PlaintiffAppellant] was and why he was coming over to talk to him, which caused anxiety, I
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suppose." (Trial transcript, p. 62.)
Plaintiff-Appellant docs not make any mention of Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to
perform an assignment to begin a home parent training and youth counseling program
given to him by letter on January 20, 1983. (Findings of Fact no. 2). The lower Court
specifically found that this assignment was never completed. (Trial transcript, p. 121.)
Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to characterize his conduct as insubstantial and minor
and not involving the main purpose of the contract, i.e., to provide home parent/proctor
training, youth counseling, and program development as needed. However, the evidence
clearly shows that in a matter of one month from when the contract began, PlaintiffAppellant made a contact expressly prohibited by the contract, failed in an assignment to
develop a training manual for which he was prepaid, violated one of the basic rules of
youth counseling by not contacting the homc parent and social worker, failed to develop
a schedule for home parent training and youth counseling as assigned and refused to
change offices supplied by Defendant-Respondent in the same building on the same floor
in order to have better interaction with Defendant-Respondent's staff.

Each of these

goes to the very heart of the contract and the type of relationship needed in a contract
for professional services.
POINT 3
THE TERMINATION WAS PROPERLY BASED ON REASONABLE GROUNDS AND DONE IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED
UNDER A TERMINATION "FOR CAUSE" PROVISION

Plaintiff-Appellant cites two (2) cases, iVI &: W Development, Inc. v. El Paso Water
Co., 634 P.2d 166 (Kan. 1981) and Prudential Federal Savings&: Loan Assoc. v. Hartford
Acc.&: Ind. Co., 325 P.2d 899 (Utah 1958) and the Restatement of Contracts 2nd, Section
241 as setting forth the applicable law in judging whether the acts of Plaintiff-Appellant
were justification for the termination by Defendant-Respondent.
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However, closer

examination of the lower Court's dceision <ind nppli"nblc contract

IHW

shows that the two

(2) cases A.nd the restatement "'ction arc not on point.
Nevertheless, assuming for a moment that they do set forth the controlling law on
the issue, it is clear from the evidence that Plaintiff-Appc'llant's conduct would have
constituted a material breach.

(See Point 2, supra).

Unlike the subject contract, the

breaches Rllegcd in the cited cases clearly did not go to the hc>art of either contract. In
Prudc>ntial at 903, this Court affirmed the lower Court's decision in finding that a
construction performance bond and contract for $763,000 was not terminated by a minor
breach when the other party failed to provide power for a short period at the beginning
of construction which "did not have the effect of preventing construction or substantially
[delay] the project."

Likewise, in M & W Development the breach was not material

because the rest of the contract was "fully executed."

Unlike those contracts, the

subject contract was a contract for personal services and the acts of Plaintiff-Appellant
clearly meet the test of materiality as set forth in the cases as well as the restatement
section cited.
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant's actions would be considered a
material breach, material breach is not the proper standard hc>rc. This case involves an
exercise of an express termination clause.

N ei thcr the cases cited nor docs the

restatement section deal with a termination provision.
The Restatement of Contracts 2nd recognizes the difference between a cancellation because of a

breach and a

termination pursuant

to a contract provision.

Restatement of Contracts 2nd Section 283(a) states that a "termination ... occurs when
either party pursuant to a power crc>ated by agreement or law put an end to the contract
otherwise then for its breach" while a "cancellation ... occurs when either party puts an
end to the contract for breach by the other." (emphasis added) Thus, this case docs not
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invo\v('

.i

c1rncellation, it involves a termination.

Tilere is Ample authority holding that "grounds for termination of a contract under
exprc" provisions th£'rein arc controlled by such provisions, which ordinarily will be
enforced according to their terms ... " 17 A C.J .S., § 399, p. 484. Sec also 17 Am Jur 2d,
§49j, p. 968 and 6 Corbin on Contracts §1266, p. 66.

In this case, the contract provision provided that the contract "may be terminated
at any time prior to the termination date for cause." While the clause in question is not
often found in contracts coming before the courts, all of the cases DefendantRespondent found have been consistent in their interpretation of the clause. Two (2) of
the cases which have dealt with the meaning of "for cause" are Quick v. Southern
Churchman Co. Inc., 199 S.E. 489 (Vir. 1938) and R. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 32
Cal.Rptr. 545 (Cal. App. 1963)
In Quick the Court explained that:
It is obvious that 'just cause' or 'good cause' is not synonymous
with legal cause • . . 'just cause' or 'good cause' cannot be
reduced to a legal certainty. To be effective, it must relate to
the circumstances relied on. The grounds upon which it is
based must be reasonable, and there should not be an abuse of
the conferred right. It must be a fair and honest cause or
reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party
exercising the power. It limits the party to the exercise of
ood faith based u on ·ust and fair ounds as dis tin ished
from an arbitrary power. emphasis added
In R. J. Cardinal at 558 and 559, the Court analyzed the words "for cause," "for just
cause" or "for good cause" at length, citing the Quick case and several other cases. The
Court concluded its discussion by explaining that "we arc of the opinion that a right to
terminate 'for cause' or 'for good cause' means upon reasonable grounds assigned in good
faith."
Th£' Trial Court correctly understood this principle of reasonable grounds and good
faith. It stated at the conclusion of the trial that "on the basis of evidence that taken
-11-

together the actions or inactions of th<' Plaintiff, if you will, constitutr a cour'C' of
conduct contrary to the fostering of the typC' of relations rC'quirC'd undC'r the contract of
December 23, 1982 to mutually benC'fit both parties. The Court bC'liC'vcs, based on the
candor of the witnes.ses and the testimony and from the demeanor of the witnesses, that
the defendant, through its agent, Mr. Burke, did act in good faith.

The voluminous

exchange of correspondence flowing from the defendant makes many references to a cooperative and even forgiving attitude by the defendant. ThC' Court believes that there
were, and evidence supports that there were at least two separate assignments . . .
Therefore, the Court finds that the termination of thC' 10th of February of 1983 was
proper and based upon sufficient grounds to fall within that termination provision of the
contract in question." (Trial transcript, pp. 120, 121; emphasis added).
CONCLUSION

There is a reasonable basis and substantial evidence to support the lower Court's
conclusion that based on the conduct of Plaintiff-Appellant, the Defendant-Respondent
acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the contract in question "for cause" as
per the terms of the contract and this Court should affirm that decision.
Respectfully submitted this

l-\

day of January, 1984.

PAUL T. MORRIS
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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9136 Soutll St.ate Street, Sandy, Utah

84()70

23, 1982
CONTRACT FOR SERVICES
:'he Wldersigned hereby agrees t::tat :.ayne :-teacham, :-iereinafter
Meacham, shall be employed as an independent consultant by

provide the following services:

1.

Home parent/Proctor training

2.
3.

Counseling
Program development as needed

.'1eacham's compensation shall be SS0.00 per hour for six (6)
months, January 1, 1983 to June JO,
in any one month.
(not hourly wage)

1983, not to exceed $3,000.00

On July 1, 1983, :1eacham's monthly compensation
shall be reduced not to exceed Sl,000.00 per

month based on a total contracted amount of $172,000.00 with
Youth Corrections until Dece.'T!ber 31,

1983 .

.'1eacham's total

You1lh Correc:tions exceeds the sum- of $82, 000 on an ;ulnUali;:ed· basis.

If the hours of service in any month are less than the $3000.00
?ol.nt prior to July 1, 1983 and SlOOO.J0 thereafter,
short fall will accumulate so

then the

maximum amount is increased

:.n the future so that Meacham will recei'J'e $18000.00 in the
::.rst half of

and $6000.00 in the second half of 1913

11l>
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t.-<rA

I CJ, .j..

..2

;;ont.
Page 2
; Great Bas
December 23, 1982

provided that he stands ready willing and able to [)rov::.de
services necessary to provide said compensation .
.'1eacham' s compensation on other contracts t.'iat Serrices
might receive shall be determined on an individual and as
needed basis.
The term of

contract is therefore :ram January l,

1983 to December 31, 1983, and may be renewed at t.'iat ti:ne
if all parties are agreeable.
Part of the ter:ns of this contract shall be t.'lat 11eacharn
will not have or develop any ongoing opposition relationships with the

of Social Services of t.'le State o:

Utah or any of it's Divisions, nor shall he represent Ser'rices
or any of Services' clients with any of said state agencies.
This shall not be construed to mean that if 11eacham has a complaint with Services or any of Services' shall not.have
righe.to :ilea grievance with t.'ie appropriate agency.

:t

shall. :nean only that Meacham shall not be in·rol,1ed in law
suits or ot.'ler serious exchanges with the Utah Depart:nent of
Social Services or any of it's agencies or personnel t.'la t wou.:..d
tend to complicate or

otherwise negatively affect Services

relationship with said Depart:nent.

If .'1eacham should become

involved in any such exchange this contract shall be voi.d
and :.<eacham' s ser·rices and compensation shall cease until
11eacham's conflict with the before mentioned Depart:nent shall
be resolved or :.mtil the contract EJer::.od has expired.
-15-

?ac;e 3

3er7lces

23,1982

This contract :nay be terminated at anytime prior to the
te=:ni.nation date for cause.

The party at fault in keeping this

=ontract agrees to pay all costs and fees relative to the settleof this contract.

Dated this 23 day of December, 1982
GREAT BASIN YOUTH SERvtCEs

3Y

,----------Layne R Meacham
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